SFAS 157 & the Market’s Assessment of Fair Valued Assets: An Examination of Fair Valued Assets Held by Financial Firms During and Following the Financial Crisis by Short, Dan
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Research Scholars Wharton School
5-27-2012
SFAS 157 & the Market’s Assessment of Fair
Valued Assets: An Examination of Fair Valued
Assets Held by Financial Firms During and
Following the Financial Crisis
Dan Short
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars
Part of the Business Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/94
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Short, Dan, "SFAS 157 & the Market’s Assessment of Fair Valued Assets: An Examination of Fair Valued Assets Held by Financial
Firms During and Following the Financial Crisis" (2012). Wharton Research Scholars. 94.
http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/94
SFAS 157 & the Market’s Assessment of Fair Valued Assets: An
Examination of Fair Valued Assets Held by Financial Firms During and
Following the Financial Crisis
Abstract
Introduced in late-2007, SFAS 157 redefined existing accounting standards concerning fair value accounting
and significantly impacted financial reporting for financial institutions. Prior studies, using larger samples of
financial firms, have concluded that Level 3 fair values (the most opaque and subjective fair values) were
heavily discounted by the market. Consistent with prior studies,
this analysis, which examined only the largest and most systemically important financial institutions during
the crisis and post-crisis periods, shows that the market did indeed ascribed a discount to Level 3 fair values,
both during the financial crisis and following the financial crisis. Adding to the literature, this paper also
observes that Level 2 fair values were discounted by the market during both the crisis and post-crisis periods,
although the discount was significantly greater during the crisis, a feature not observed for Level 1 or Level 3
fair values or examined in prior studies.
Keywords
banking, accounting standards, financial regulation, financial crisis, valuation, opacity, transparency, fair value,
SFAS 157, level one, level two, level three
Disciplines
Business
This thesis or dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/94
Keywords: banking, accounting standards, financial regulation, financial crisis, valuation, 
opacity, transparency, fair value, SFAS 157, level one, level two, level three  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SFAS 157 & the Market’s Assessment of Fair Valued Assets: 
 
An Examination of Fair Valued Assets Held by Financial Firms  
During and Following the Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dan Short 
Wharton Research Scholars 
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
Adviser: Dr. Richard Herring, with special  
assistance from David Muir 
May 27, 2012 
Abstract 
Introduced in late-2007, SFAS 157 redefined existing accounting standards concerning fair value 
accounting and significantly impacted financial reporting for financial institutions.  Prior studies, 
using larger samples of financial firms, have concluded that Level 3 fair values (the most opaque 
and subjective fair values) were heavily discounted by the market.  Consistent with prior studies, 
this analysis, which examined only the largest and most systemically important financial 
institutions during the crisis and post-crisis periods, shows that the market did indeed ascribed a 
discount to Level 3 fair values, both during the financial crisis and following the financial crisis.  
Adding to the literature, this paper also observes that Level 2 fair values were discounted by the 
market during both the crisis and post-crisis periods, although the discount was significantly 
greater during the crisis, a feature not observed for Level 1 or Level 3 fair values or examined in 
prior studies. 
 
Introduction 
Since the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) announced a sweeping overhaul and 
standardization of fair value accounting rules on September 15, 2006, the requirements and 
framework specified under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (SFAS 157) 
have been a source of controversy and debate.  Prior to SFAS 157, which took effect for all 
quarterly and annual statements filed during fiscal years beginning after November 15, 2007, fair 
value accounting standards varied widely in practice.  Regulators intended that the fair value 
standards prescribed by SFAS 157 would lead to greater clarity and diminished complexity 
within financial statements, while also ensuring greater comparability of financial statements 
across firms.  As FASB noted in regards to the then-new standards, “A single definition of fair 
value, together with a framework for measuring fair value, should result in increased consistency 
and comparability in fair value measurements” (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 57). 
Beyond FASB’s stated motivations for SFAS 157, a number of other considerations 
support a broad and standardized implementation of fair value accounting.  First, fair value 
accounting should reduce information asymmetries between the preparers of financial statements 
and users of financial statements.  Further, fair value accounting reduces the real option that 
exists for bank managers (and managers more generally) that often runs counter to shareholder 
interests (Milbradt, 56).  Without fair value accounting provisions, managers are incentivized to 
sell assets which have appreciated in value, thus allowing the firm to recognize a realized gain.  
Conversely, absent fair value requirements, managers are implicitly encouraged to hold assets 
whose value has fallen below cost, as losses will only affect the financial statements upon sale of 
the asset1.  More importantly, empirical research has shown that increased disclosure and greater 
transparency are associated with lower costs of capital and thus higher valuations.   Lambert, 
Leuz, and Verrecchia noted that higher quality information and disclosure (which SFAS 157 is 
presumed to encourage) reduces costs of capital by reducing the variation of estimates of future 
cash flows.  Likewise, Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker found that the cost of capital was 
approximately 3% higher for opaque financial firms relative to more transparent firms (669).  
Finally, Wallace notes that SFAS 157 is consistent with regulatory and supervisory objectives, 
noting that “the key measure that is used to gauge the risk of default within a firm under this 
system is the sufficiency of the firm’s current (market) value of assets to cover the current (fair) 
value of the firm’s liabilities or debt” (13). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although this real option can exist in any industry, it is most prominent in the financial industry 
due to capital requirements.  Because regulatory capital is based off of accounting data, the 
ability to sell an asset whose value has appreciated (thus raising regulatory capital), while being 
able to defer the recognition of losses on an asset whose value has fallen below acquisition cost 
(thus avoiding a decline in regulatory capital) is a particularly valuable option for bank 
managers.   
Despite evidence and theory supporting a more standardized approach to fair value 
accounting standards, the most recent empirical research on the subject of fair value accounting 
concerns the role of fair value during the financial crisis.  Critics of SFAS 157 contend that the 
requirements exacerbated the crisis by introducing a downward spiral in asset prices.  
Specifically, critics contend that declines in assets held at fair value caused banks to sell assets to 
raise capital and comply with regulatory capital requirements.  This forced selling led to further 
price declines, which led to further sales in response to the need to raise additional regulatory 
capital, with this cycle repeating itself and resulting in a downward price spiral2.  To date, 
though, empirical research indicates that SFAS 157 did not exacerbate the financial crisis in any 
meaningful way.  Specifically, as mandated by Congress, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission examined the role of SFAS 157 during the crisis and concluded that fair value 
disclosure requirements  “did not play a meaningful role in the failures” of 50 financial 
institutions sampled during from the crisis (Badertscher, Burks, & Easton, 65).  Badertscher, 
Burks, and Easton further noted that bad debt expense, not fair value adjustments, drove the 
decline in regulatory capital for financial institutions during the crisis.  Summarizing their 
findings, they noted: 
…industry- and firm-level sales of AFS and HTM securities during the crisis were 
similar to levels before the crisis… We also find no evidence that banks increasingly sold 
securities at losses during the crisis, providing no support for claims that fair value 
accounting caused ‘‘fire-sales’’ of assets…. our evidence suggests that if accounting-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 According to SFAS 157, forced sales to raise regulatory capital should have been classified as 
distressed sales and such transactions should not have been used in the determination of fair 
value.  In practice, determining whether a transaction is in fact distressed in nature is often a 
challenging task for auditors.	  
based depletions of regulatory capital played a role in the crisis, the main culprit was bad 
debt expense… (87-88)  
While so-called price spirals and their relationship with SFAS 157 will not be discussed here, the 
following analysis will examine the degree to which users of financial statements trusted fair 
value disclosures, both during and following the financial crisis.  
Irrespective of the motivations supporting and critiques of SFAS 157 and fair value 
accounting, the significance of FASB’s shift to a more unified definition and application of fair 
value for financial firms was, and remains, significant; at the end of 2011, the six largest U.S. 
financial institutions3 held a combined $8.47 trillion of assets at fair value4. 
 
Overview of Applicable Accounting Standards 
Prior to discussing the specific details of this analysis, it is important to under why fair value 
accounting standards are so relevant for financial firms.  To do so requires an understanding of 
Accounting Standards Codification 320 (ASC 320), which outlines the treatment of held-to-
maturity, trading, and available-for-sale securities.  While ASC 320 applies to all reporting 
entities5, the standards are most relevant for financial firms because the majority of their 
operating assets are classified as HTM, trading, or AFS securities and the corresponding 
treatment of these assets can dramatically affect the financial performance and position depicted 
by the financial statements, as well as the degree to which SFAS 157 is applicable. 
 
ASC 320: Held-to-Maturity Securities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley 
4 Firms are permitted to report fully hedged derivatives and other assets held at fair value on a 
net basis. The aggregate amount of fair valued assets actually reported on balance sheet is thus 
significantly less than $8.47 trillion, but significant nonetheless. 
5 Non-profit and select broker dealers are exempt 
As mandated by ASC 320, financial firms may only classify debt instruments as held-to-maturity 
securities.  Only instruments that “management has both the positive intent6 and the ability to 
hold until maturity” may be classified as held-to-maturity securities.  Because FASB crafted an 
intentionally restrictive definition of held-to-maturity, firms must often maintain evidence of 
positive intent to hold a given security until maturity (Ernst & Young, 11).  For financial firms, 
loans traditionally constitute the bulk of the firm’s held-to-maturity securities.  Crucially, 
securities classified as HTM are measured at amortized cost on the balance sheet and are not 
subject to periodic fair value adjustments7.  Temporary fluctuations in the value of HTM 
securities are similarly not reflect in the income statement.  While ASC 320 stands independent 
of SFAS 157 and fair value reporting standards, the two became interrelated during the financial 
crisis, as regulators allowed many institutions to reclassify massive portfolios of assets as HTM 
securities to avoid losses associated with mark-to-market adjustments.  Such regulatory decisions 
would not be expected to cast doubt on the fair values reported in the financial statements, but 
such actions do bring into doubt the broader utility of fair value if regulators show a willingness 
to suspend requirements during times of crisis, when fair values are arguably of greatest value to 
investors, counterparties, and other users of financial statements. 
 
ASC 320: Trading Securities 
ASC 320 defines trading securities as either debt or equity securities “bought and held primarily 
to be sold in the near term” (Ernst & Young, 15).  In the context of financial firms, such 
securities are traditionally held in conjunction with speculative bets on short-term price 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Securities which the firm intends to hold for an indefinite period do not receive held-to-
maturity classification. 
7 All securities, however, are subject to periodic impairment tests.  If auditors or management 
judge an asset to be “other-than-temporarily impaired”, the firm must adjust the asset’s value 
down to its fair value. 
movements or are held to facilitate market-making activities.  While FASB does not specify a 
time frame that qualifies as “near term”, accounting professionals generally considered securities 
with intended holding periods of days or weeks as worthy of the trading classification.  Unlike 
HTM securities, trading securities are recorded at fair value on the balance sheet, with changes in 
the fair value reflected in earnings every reporting period. 
 
ASC 320: Available-for-sale Securities 
Available-for-sale securities effectively represent the residual after accounting for HTM and 
trading securities.  FASB defines AFS securities as “debt securities not classified as either held-
to-maturity or trading  and equity securities that have readily determinable fair values not 
classified as trading...” (Ernst & Young, 18).  The reporting entity’s intent with regard to the sale 
of the asset, rather than the nature of the security, is the dominant concern.  Reflecting a blend of 
the treatment afforded to HTM and trading securities, AFS securities are measured at fair value 
on the balance sheet.  However, changes in the fair value of AFS securities during the reporting 
period do not affect earnings, but are instead reflected as a change in Other Comprehensive 
Income.  Upon the disposal of the asset, any unrealized gains or losses recognized in 
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income will then be recognized in earnings during the 
corresponding reporting period.  
   
SFAS 157: 
As discussed above, SFAS 157 represented a dramatic shift in FASB’s approach to fair value as 
it applies to financial statements.  FASB defined fair value as follows: “Fair value is the price 
that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction 
between market participants at the measurement date.”  A definition that would prove crucial and 
highly contentious during the financial crisis, standard setters further defined an “orderly 
transaction” as a “transaction that assumes exposure to the market for a period to the 
measurement date to allow for marketing activities that are usual and customary for transactions 
involving such assets or liabilities; it is not a forced transaction (for example, a forced liquidation 
or distress sale)” (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 8). 
 
SFAS 157: Fair Value Hierarchy 
The most relevant aspect of SFAS 157 as it pertains to this paper is the so-called fair value 
hierarchy, which classifies assets and liabilities held at fair value according to the reliability and 
observablility of the inputs used to determine their fair value.  At the broadest level, SFAS 157 
distinguishes between observable and unobservable inputs.  Observable inputs are those inputs 
reflecting assumptions market participants would use when pricing the asset that are obtained 
from sources independent of the reporting entity.  FASB mandates that firms use observable 
inputs whenever such inputs are available to determine fair value.  Unobservable inputs, in 
contrast, are those inputs that reflect the firm’s own assumptions about assumptions that market 
participants would use to price the asset using “the best available information under the 
circumstances.”  Although an oversimplification, unobservable inputs can be thought of as one 
step detached from actual market data.  Emerging from the definitions of observable and 
unobservable inputs was FASB’s definition of Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair values, which 
will constitute the focus of this analysis. 
 
Level 1 Fair Values 
Fair valued assets classified as Level 1 assets are presumably the most reliable of all fair values.  
Level 1 fair values are assets or liabilities whose fair values are determined using quoted and 
unadjusted prices “in active markets for identical assets or liabilities at the measurement date.”  
Just as the term “orderly transaction” became a point of contention and dispute during the 
financial crisis, so too did the term “active market”, which FASB defines as a “market in which 
transactions for the asset or liability occur with sufficient frequency and volume to provide 
pricing information on an ongoing basis8” (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 12).  As 
Level 1 fair values are determined exclusively using observable inputs, SFAS 157 requires that 
firms use Level 1 fair values whenever possible.    
 
Level 2 Fair Values 
Fair values determined using Level 2 inputs are less reliable than those determined using Level 1 
inputs, but still rely upon observable inputs and represent largely objective measurements of fair 
value.  SFAS 157 defines Level 2 inputs as “Other than quoted prices included with Level 1 that 
are observable for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly” (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, 12).  Common examples of Level 2 inputs are quoted prices for similar assets 
in active markets, quoted prices for identical or similar assets in inactive markets, or assets 
whose price is determined from some other observable input such as the yield curve or matrix 
pricing.   
During the financial crisis, the application of SFAS 157 for Level 2 assets was most 
relevant, as the majority of MBS securities and other complex securitized products held by the 
largest financial institutions were initially fair valued using Level 2 inputs9.  However, as 
liquidity in the mortgage and asset-backed security markets evaporated and as asset sales became 
increasingly distressed in nature during the financial crisis, Congress and regulators pressured 
the SEC and FASB to ease fair value requirements.  In response, FASB issued FASB Staff 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Common markers of an inactive market include wide bid-ask spreads, a significant increase in 
implied liquidity premiums, and wide variations in quoted prices across market-makers or time. 
9 Many securitizations were valued using Level 2 inputs because markets for specific securities 
were often thin and because assets were often comparable, but not identical as required of Level 
1 inputs. 
Position (FSP) 157-4, which clarified the definitions of “orderly transaction” and “active 
market”.  Although FSP 157-4 did not represent a material change to existing fair value 
requirements and officially only reaffirmed existing guidance, many viewed FSP 157-4 as a 
loosening of fair value requirements.  Specifically, the release emphasized that if a market 
transaction was not deemed to be orderly, the reporting entity need not consider the resulting and 
prevailing market price as indicative of fair value.  Further, FASB reiterated that market prices in 
inactive and illiquid markets would require inherently subjective adjustments to accurately depict 
fair value.  In inactive markets, firms were encouraged to use multiple valuation approaches and 
to then select a point within the resulting range of valuations which the firm and its auditors felt 
was most representative of the asset’s fair value “under current market conditions.”  While many 
markets were indeed increasingly inactive and many transactions disorderly during the latter half 
of 2008, FSP 157-4 and the regulatory pressure that prompted it undoubtedly injected additional 
subjectivity and uncertainty into the determination and reporting of fair values and implicitly 
encouraged greater use of unobservable (Level 3) inputs.      
 
Level 3 Fair Values 
All assets marked to fair value using unobservable inputs are classified as Level 3 and firms are 
only permitted to value an asset using Level 3 inputs when observable inputs (Level 1 or 2) are 
unavailable.  While the general objective of determining fair value remains the same when using 
Level 3 inputs, the approach differs significantly, as the firm must make assumptions about the 
assumptions market participants are likely to use when valuing the asset. Unsurprisingly, this 
process can yield dubious and highly subjective fair values and the resulting values are often 
referred to as “mark-to-model”.  More cynical observers note that “mark-to-make-believe” is a 
more appropriate descriptor of Level 3 valuations.  These sentiments were only reinforced during 
the crisis, as many financial firms, most notably Lehman Brothers prior to declaring bankruptcy, 
aggressively shifted mortgage backed securities and other assets from Level 2 to Level 3 during 
2008 in an effort to prop up the on-balance sheet values for these assets.  Because of the inherent 
subjectivity associated with the determination of Level 3 fair values, firms are required to 
disclose the assumptions and methods used to determine fair values along with a detailed 
reconciliation of changes in the amount and composition of Level 3 assets during the reporting 
period. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Research Objectives & Hypotheses 
The approach used in this analysis replicates the approach used by Goh, Ng, and Yong in 
“Market Pricing of Banks’ Fair Value Assets Reported under SSFAS 157 during the 2008 
Economic Crisis” (2009) and loosely mirrors the approach of Song, Thomas, and Yi in “Value 
Relevance of FAS 157 Fair Value Hierarchy Information and the Impact of Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms” (2010).  These analyses, which examined the efficacy SFAS 157 
during the peak of the financial crisis in 2008, found that the market ascribed valuations to Level 
1, 2 and 3 assets in accordance with the perceived transparency and reliability of the inputs used 
to determine the respective fair values.  Specifically, Goh, et. al found that the market priced 
Level 1 net assets at $.85 on the dollar, Level 2 net assets at $.63 on the dollar, and Level 3 net 
assets at $.49 on the dollar (18).  They noted that pricing of more transparent Level 1 assets was 
statistically different from both Level 2 and Level 3 assets.  Further, they noted that, as the 
financial crisis deepened into the third and fourth quarters of 2008, the market ascribed 
progressively lower valuations to Level 2 and Level 3 assets, while the valuations ascribed to 
reported Level 1 assets held constant (19-20).  
In light of these studies, the objectives of this research are two-fold.  First, given that this 
analysis relies upon the method and general findings of Goh, Ng, and Yong (2009), I will 
examine whether their findings, which analyzed 1,993 domestic banking institutions, apply to a 
smaller subset of only the largest, most systemically important financial firms.  Given that the 
firms in my sample engaged to a greater degree in capital markets activity and securitization of 
the opaque and illiquid assets whose fair values were most questionable during the financial 
crisis10, it is expected that market discount on Level 2 and 3 assets observed in Goh et al. will be 
observed here.  While the first objective of this analysis does not greatly extend the existing 
literature, it is important in establishing a baseline for the subsequent portion of this analysis.   
Second, this paper seeks to extend the analysis using the approximately three years of 
financial data produced since the nadir of the financial crisis.  Using this data, I will determine 
whether the discount applied to lower levels of fair value assets persists from 2009 onward.  In 
conjunction with this analysis, I have defined a crisis dummy variable and will examine the 
statistical significance of the crisis in relation to the market’s pricing of Level 1, 2, and 3 assets.  
The results of these regressions should yield one of two conclusions.  First, the market could 
ascribe statistically equivalent discounts to Level 1, 2, and 3 assets, respectively, during and 
following the crisis.  Alternatively, the results could indicate that the market ascribes statistically 
different discounts to Level 1, 2, and 3 assets in the crisis and post-crisis periods.  If the market 
ascribes statistically different discounts in the post-crisis period, it would indicate that some 
exogenous market or regulatory factor exacerbated the frictions and perceived inaccuracies of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For firms in the 1,993-firm sample, net Level 3 assets as a percent of total net fair value assets 
was 4.1%.  For firms in the 46-firm sample, net Level 3 assets as a percent of total net fair value 
assets 13.4%, a significant difference of 9.3%. 
fair value accounting during the crisis.  The potential sources of such frictions and perceived 
inaccuracies will be explored.  
 
Data Set 
The data set for this analysis includes 46 large-cap financial firms based in the United States.  
The sample was restricted to include only those firms with assets in excess of $25B as of the end 
of the second quarter of 2007, just prior to the date at which SFAS 157 took effect.  The sample 
was limited to financial firms with more than $25B of assets for two primary reasons.  First, the 
regulatory and operating environments for the largest domestic financial firms are distinct from 
those in which smaller financial institutions operate.  Larger firms are subject to additional 
oversight and must traditionally abide by different capital standards.  At the same time, the 
largest firms experience the added benefit of a wider government-sponsored safety net.  
Accounting for these differences in a meaningful fashion through control variables would have 
been exceptionally challenging given the limitations inherent in the available datasets.  Finally, 
limiting the sample to the only the largest financial institutions is consistent with the broader 
objective of this analysis.  Much of the controversy regarding SFAS 157 concerned the treatment 
of assets for the United States’ largest financial firms.  Including smaller firms thus distracts 
from the potential policy implications and qualitative conclusions that might emerge from the 
analysis.  The sample was further limited to include only U.S.-based financial institutions for 
similar reasons and because GAAP and IFRS have not yet been sufficiently harmonized so as to 
allow for appropriate comparison among international and domestic banking institutions. 
Firms included in the initial screen were limited to those with Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes associated with commercial banking, savings and loans, or security 
and brokerage functions.  Of the firms that satisfied the screening criteria detailed above, they 
carried the SIC codes as shown below. A complete list of firms included in the sample is shown 
below.  
Financial data for firms included in the sample was collected from Compustat Quarterly.  
Share prices and shares outstanding data were obtained from CRSP.  While Compustat does not 
provide a detailed breakdown of the accounts most relevant for an analysis of financial firms, 
commonly preferred databases such as Bankscope do not yet provide reliable historical data for 
quarterly periods.  
 
 
 
 
 
Method 
The model employed in this analysis is consistent with models employed in similar research.  
The table below provides descriptions of the variables used throughout the following analysis.  
All variables are normalized by the total amount of shares outstanding at the date quarterly 
earnings were announced rather than at the balance sheet date.  The share price (shprrdq) is the 
average share price on the day earnings were announced and on the three trading days before and 
after the earnings announcement.  This averaging adjustment was introduced to control for 
information leakage prior to the earnings announcement and to allow an adjustment period in 
case the market reaction to the announcement was not immediate.  The variables netlvlone, 
netlvltwo, and netlvlthree represent Level 1, 2, and 3 assets per share net of Level 1, 2, and 3 
liabilities per share, respectively.  Nonfvassets represents assets not held at fair value less 
liabilities not held at fair value on a per share basis.  Earnings per share was provided in the 
Compustat data.  Attempts to include other variables intended to capture accounting opacity or 
transparency, differences in performance across firms, and predictability of performance across 
firms were unsuccessful.  Variables such as goodwill per share, return on assets, return on equity, 
or net interest income per share were either insignificant in every analysis or highly collinear 
with existing explanatory variables.  Lastly, a binary “crisis” dummy variable was introduced to 
examine the effect of the financial crisis.  The crisis period was defined as the Q4 of 2007 (the 
earliest period for which most of the firms in the sample reported under SFAS 157) through Q1 
of 2009.  Q2 of 2009 onward was defined as the post-crisis period11.  Although the actual end of 
the crisis period is debatable, this cutoff was chosen because the market bottomed prior to the 
release of Q2 2009 results and because revised accounting standards (FSP 157-4) were clarified 
prior the release of Q2 2009 financial reports.     
 
 
The analyses are conducted using pooled ordinary least squares regression, as shown 
below.  Beyond allowing for comparison with prior analyses, the model employed is this analysis 
is beneficial because the interpretation of the model’s results is highly intuitive.  Because the 
Level 1, 2, and 3 and non-fair value assets are presented net of liabilities and are normalized by 
shares outstanding, the variables effectively represent the equity value per share attributable to 
the respective asset type.  Thus the coefficients associated with each variable represent how 
much each additional dollar per share of net assets for each asset type (in book terms) contributes 
to the share price.  The use of earnings per share as a control variable was introduced by Goh, et. 
al to account for differences in profitability across firms, which can influence price to book ratios 
independent of the level of net assets (16).  
 
€ 
shprrdqi,t = α0 + β1netlvlonei,t + β2netlvltwoi,t + β3netlvlthreei,t + β4nonfvassetsi,t + β5EPSi,t +ε i,t  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Fiscal year second quarters ended in May, June, or July for firms in the sample.  
Results 
Regression 1: Full Sample 
The first analysis utilizes the entire dataset and replicates the method employed by Goh, et. al. 
with 594 quarterly observations across the 46 firms.  The average share price during the 
approximately four-year period was $26.25.  Interestingly, net assets at fair value per share 
averaged $95.77 and net assets not at fair value per share averaged ($68.49), reflecting the fact 
that financial institutions typically carry a greater percentage of their assets at fair value than 
their liabilities.  Among assets classified under the fair value hierarchy, net Level 2 assets per 
share was the largest and net Level 3 assets per share was the second largest, although 
significantly less than net Level 2 assets per share.  Note that while ROA, ROE, goodwill per 
share, and total assets are included in the table below, these variables were not included in the 
regression model, as they failed to prove significant or were prohibitively collinear with other 
explanatory variables.   The results of the full sample model reflect prior empirical studies and 
show that the market ascribes a lower than reported value to Level 2 and Level 3 assets (73.3 
cents and 60.4 cents per dollar of net assets, respectively).  Interestingly, Level 1 assets, whose 
book values should almost undisputedly reflect market values, have a coefficient that is 
significantly less than 1.  The reasons for this will be discussed later.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression 2: In-Crisis Sample 
The second analysis utilizes only the portion of the dataset defined as the financial crisis and 
includes data from Q4 2007 through Q1 2009.  The period includes 209 observations and is 
unbalanced in that not all firms reported under SFAS 157 for the 4th quarter of 2007.  The results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the market values assets according to their placement in 
the fair value hierarchy.  Level 1 net assets during the crisis were valued at 71.5 cents on the 
dollar, Level 2 at 55.4 cents on the dollar, and Level 3 at 53.1 cents on the dollar (all 
significantly different from one).  None of the coefficients are statistically different from one 
another, however. 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Regression 3: Post-Crisis Sample 
In contrast to the second analysis, the third analysis utilizes only the portion of the dataset 
defined as the post-financial crisis period and includes data from Q2 2009 through Q4 2011.  The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the market values assets according to their 
placement in the fair value hierarchy.  Level 1 net assets following the crisis were valued at 83.9 
cents on the dollar, Level 2 at 83.4 cents on the dollar, and Level 3 at 66.0 cents on the dollar (all 
significantly different from one).  Note that the difference between Level 2 and Level 3 is 
statistically significant, as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Regression 4: Full Sample with Crisis Interaction Effects 
The final analysis combines the results of Regressions 2 and 3 using a dummy variable for the 
crisis and interaction effects.  The crisis variable is defined as 1 if the quarterly reporting period 
is Q1 of 2009 or earlier and takes the value 0 if the reporting period is Q2 of 2009 or later.  The 
results below show that Level 1 net assets are valued nearly identically in the in-crisis and post-
crisis periods, at approximately 80 cents on the dollar.  Level 2 net assets are valued at 81.6 cents 
on the dollar following the crisis, but only 65.9 cents on the dollar during the crisis, a statistically 
significant difference.  Level 3 assets, meanwhile, are valued at only 67.7 cents on the dollar 
following the crisis, while these assets were discounted another 9.70% during the crisis.  All 
assets at fair value, regardless of the period, are valued by the market at significantly less than 
100 cents on the dollar. 
   
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The results presented above yield several potential observations and conclusions.  Namely, the 
surprising discount applied to Level 1 fair values generally, the significantly greater discount 
applied to Level 2 assets during the financial crisis, and the confirmation of heavy discounting of 
Level 3 fair values will be discussed. 
First, in all four analyses, the market ascribed a discount to Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 
assets.  Notably, in the fourth and most descriptive analysis, the market ascribed a discount of 
approximately 20% to the reported fair values for Level 1 assets, with the discount being 
effectively identical in the in-crisis and post-crisis periods.  This finding is inconsistent with the 
findings of prior research, which found that the market’s valuation of Level 1 assets was not 
statistically different from 100 cents on the dollar.  Further, the inputs used to determine fair 
value for assets classified as Level 1 are highly transparent, objective, and observable, making it 
surprising that the market does not fully agree with the values presented in the financial 
statements.  Several possible explanations for this observation exist, though.  First, the firms in 
the sample saw declining price-to-book ratios during the sample period, a trend reflective of the 
diminished profitability that has resulted from the financial crisis and the elimination of once-
profitable business units.  In conjunction with this trend (and a major contributor to it) is the 
increased regulatory uncertainty that has characterized the operating environment for the largest 
financial institutions the past several years.  That new regulations such as Basel III, Dodd-Frank 
(namely the Volcker Rule), and any eventual rules governing Systemtically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFIs) predominantly, if not exclusively, affect the largest financial firms perhaps 
explains why the coefficients in these analyses reflect greater uncertainty for all assets reported 
at fair value than the coefficients in models examining samples with both large and small firms.  
Finally, it should be noted that while the model formulation used in this analysis is consistent 
with models used in prior research and is theoretically correct, it is also perhaps excessively 
literal.  In practice, bank analysts do not literally value a financial institution’s equity by 
determining a market value for each individual asset net of liabilities.  Valuation is more nuanced 
and incorporates other considerations.   
Beyond the fact the Level 1 assets are seen to carry a statistically significant discount 
from reported fair values, this analysis also suggests a potentially interesting conclusion about 
the efficacy of Level 2 fair values.  In prior studies, researchers found that the market applied a 
significantly greater discount to Level 2 assets than Level 1 assets, although the discount was 
smaller than that ascribed to Level 3 fair values.  In this analysis, none of the regressions show a 
statistically significant difference between the discount applied to Level 2 assets and Level 1 
assets, but the point estimates are noticeably smaller for Level 2 assets12.  Interestingly, though, 
Regression 4 shows that the “crisis” interaction term is only statistically significant for Level 2 
fair values.  During the non-crisis period, the market valued Level 2 assets at 81.6% of their 
reported value.  During the financial crisis, the market valued Level 2 assets at 65.9% of their 
reported value, a discount of 15.7%.  These results are interesting for two reasons.  First, the 
results reflect the nature of the financial crisis, as the majority of mortgage backed securities 
(MBS) and asset backed securities (ABS) were fair valued using Level 2 inputs13.  As the 
markets for these assets became increasingly illiquid and opaque and as the value of these assets 
declined at a rapid pace during the financial crisis, it is reasonable to surmise that the pricing 
uncertainty and divergence in fair value opinions (both the market’s and auditors’ opinions) was 
greatest for MBS and ABS assets relative to other assets.  Further, Level 2 fair values occupy a 
unique position in the fair value hierarchy.  Level 1 fair values are generally indisputable 
regardless of the period (crisis or non-crisis), as they are developed using observable, objective 
inputs.  Level 3 fair values, as will be discussed below, are highly subjective regardless and the 
market appears to have little trust in Level 3 fair values regardless of the period, as uncertainty is 
ever-present within Level 3 fair values.  However, Level 2 fair values are unique because they 
effectively represent pricing by analogy14.  If all of the analogous markets upon which one might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 That the samples for previous studies were nearly 20 times larger could explain why the results 
presented here did not exhibit statistically significant differences. 
13 Many firms did not disclose a breakdown of MBS and ABS classifications according to the 
fair value hierarchy during the initial reporting periods following the implementation of SFAS 
157.  In their 2007 10-Ks, though, the following firms valued their MBS/ABS assets using Level 
2 inputs as follows: Goldman Sachs (70.4% of $54.1B MBS/ABS), J.P. Morgan (90.5% of 
$30.1B MBS/ABS), Lehman Brothers (71.5% of $89.1B MBS/ABS), Bear Stearns (62.6% of 
$46.1B MBS/ABS).  Only Lehman Brothers carried any MBS/ABS as a Level 1 assets, carrying 
just $240mm (.3% of their holdings) as Level 3 assets. 
14 Recall that Level 2 fair values are often developed by referencing prices for similar assets in 
different markets. 
base a Level 2 valuation have become illiquid or distressed, certainty regarding the real price or 
fair value diminishes.  Lastly, FASB’s relatively broad definition of distressed sales and of 
illiquid markets, paired with the unwillingness of auditors to initially incorporate adjustments to 
fair value methodologies, during the financial crisis likely contributed to the increased discount 
applied to Level 2 fair values. 
Finally, all four analyses indicate that the market values Level 3 assets at a value 
statistically different from 100 cents on the dollar, typically between 50 to 70 cents on the dollar.  
As shown in Regression 4, the market prices Level 3 assets at 67.7% of their reported valued 
outside of the crisis and at 58.0% of their reported value during the crisis, although the difference 
is not statistically significant from Level 2 assets.  The coefficients for Level 3 assets are 
significantly lower than those for Level 2 assets only in the post-crisis sample (Regression 3).  
These findings regarding the market’s valuation of Level 3 assets mirror those of past studies and 
imply that market participants ascribe significant discounts to the Level 3 fair values reported by 
financial firms, thus supporting existing criticisms of SFAS 157.  However, criticisms of SFAS 
157 that focus on the apparent unreliability of Level 3 fair values ignore the possible alternatives. 
Compared to the alternative (reporting the assets at historical or acquisition cost), this analysis 
implies that Level 3 fair values at least do not increase uncertainty for users of financial 
statements.  In all four regressions performed above, the difference in the market’s valuation of 
non-fair value assets and Level 3 assets was insignificant.  In the model including “crisis” 
interaction effects (Regression 4), the market actually ascribed a statistically greater discount to 
non-fair value assets during the crisis, while this trend was not observed for Level 3. In sum, the 
apparent worst-case scenario indicated by this analysis is that the existence of a Level 3 
classification within the fair value hierarchy provides no additional useful information to users of 
financial statements. 
 
Further Research 
The results of this analysis provide a number of avenues for further research.  A subsequent 
analysis could adopt a more granular approach, analyzing individual balance sheet accounts to 
examine how differences in the composition and level of assets within the fair value hierarchy 
affects the way in which the market values these assets.  As discussed earlier, this approach was 
not adopted here due to the lack of a database that could provide such granular information on a 
quarterly basis.  Additionally, future research could incorporate additional more descriptive 
forward-looking explanatory variables.  Such variables, while perhaps more subjective, could 
include equity analyst opinions or other variables that might capture the market’s expectations of 
future performance.  Diminished expectations of future performance for financial firms, rather 
than inadequate accounting standards, could explain the discount to fair value witnessed here.  
Finally, as GAAP and IFRS are increasingly harmonized, an international comparison of fair 
value accounting standards would add to the literature. 
 
Conclusion 
While SFAS 157 represented a significant shift in the approach to fair value accounting.  
Consistent with prior research, this analysis confirms that the market ascribes a significant 
discount to Level 3 fair values as reported under SFAS 157.  However, this analysis, which 
examined the market’s valuation of assets held at different levels of the fair value hierarchy also 
showed how the market’s assessments of fair value changed between the crisis and post crisis 
periods.  The results indicate that Level 2 assets, not the most opaque Level 3 assets, saw the 
greatest increase in market skepticism due to the financial crisis, and it is speculated that this 
trend is observed due to the nature of Level 2 inputs (pricing via analogy) and because of the 
nature of the financial crisis (emanating from assets initially valued as Level 2).
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